The wind-down of Bank of Asia (BVI) Limited has shifted into a new phase of controversy. A deal to transfer the institution's banking licence and assets to SWB LLC, connected to Soulpower Acquisition Corporation, is now drawing intense scrutiny over the buyer's background and how the sale process unfolded.
Soulpower, a Cayman Islands company traded on the New York Stock Exchange, has become entangled in separate litigation in the United States. The Securities and Exchange Commission has alleged securities fraud involving more than US$1 billion in that separate case. While Soulpower's involvement in those allegations remains unclear, the connection has raised alarm about the due diligence applied to the BVI transaction, the valuation of equity in the deal, regulatory approval and the method used to select the buyer.
Russell Crumpler, one of the joint liquidators managing the bank's collapse, has been instrumental in steering the sale process. Yet reporting indicates that other credible bids to acquire the bank's licence and assets were submitted but apparently went unacknowledged. That raises a critical question: did the liquidators adequately test the market before committing to this transaction?
From Ambition to Insolvency
Bank of Asia entered the BVI financial sector with considerable promise. Incorporated in August 2015 and granted a restricted licence in March 2017, it began operations in 2018 and upgraded to a general banking licence by March 2021. The arrival mattered: no new banking licence had been issued in the territory for roughly two decades.
The bank aimed to serve customers across Asia, offering offshore banking and digital financial services. But beneath the surface, serious problems were developing.
The BVI Financial Services Commission flagged concerns about the bank's financial health in July 2024. A month later, regulators issued a directive requiring the institution to fix capital shortfalls. In February 2025, an independent assessment by Deloitte, commissioned by the FSC, concluded the bank was insolvent or headed toward insolvency.
The core issue centred on related-party loans and exposures. Nearly half of the bank's assets, possibly more, consisted of money owed by connected parties. These were not technical accounting matters; they struck at the fundamental soundness of the institution and the quality of what it held.
Government Deposits Raise Accountability Questions
The collapse took on added weight when it became public that the Government of the Virgin Islands held approximately US$5 million in deposits at Bank of Asia. The deposit was placed in 2025, well after regulators had begun raising alarms about the bank's condition.
The deposit itself does not prove wrongdoing. However, it legitimately raises questions about how government officials assessed the risk, what information they possessed and what protections they applied to public money. The public has a right to understand the safeguards applied when millions in government funds were entrusted to an institution already under regulatory examination.
Court-Supervised Wind-Down
On May 28, 2025, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court appointed joint provisional liquidators to assume control of Bank of Asia. The next day, the FSC and the Virgin Islands Deposit Insurance Corporation announced the formal wind-down. Depositors received protection of up to US$100,000 per eligible account under the deposit insurance scheme.
The liquidation has proceeded under court oversight, with authorities and liquidators managing the closure and safeguarding covered deposits.
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first.